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LANDOWNER LIABILITY UNDER
CERCLA: IS INNOCENCE A DEFENSE?
Protection of the environment is in the forefront of American
politics and national attention.' An important means to achieve
this goal is by cleanup and regulation of hazardous waste sites.'
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)3 is the primary vehicle for
cleanup action. CERCLA was originally premised on the theory
that the "polluter must pay,"' which was the basis for the taxing
I See Bush, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10293, 10298 (Aug. 1988); Dukakis, 18
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10296 (Aug. 1988) (candidates for the presidential election
promised that environmental issues would be given high priority). One candidate promised
to aggressively enforce environmental laws, "putting the responsibility for cleanup where it
belongs, on those who caused the problem in the first place ...." Bush, at 10294. See also
Adams and McSlarrow, Seizing 1989 as a Window of Opportunity: An Environmental Challenge
to the Next Administration, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10419 (Oct. 1988) (EPA chal-
lenging new administration to confront serious environmental issues). Political attention is
primarily a response to widespread public concern about threats to the environment and
human life from abandoned hazardous waste sites. See King, Lenders' Liability for Cleanup
Costs, 18 Envt. L. 241, 242 (1988) (growing concern over inadequate disposal of hazardous
waste prompted laws to be enacted). See also Note, Generator Liability Under Superfund For
Clean-up of Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (1982)
(national attention to hazardous waste disasters during late 1970's provided political impe-
tus for response).
' See generally 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1987 & Supp. 1988) (over-
view of environmental protection laws). In addition to statutes which provide for cleanup,
there are many environmental statutes which provide other vehicles for effecting protec-
tion of the environment and health. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-78 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988) (employees required to provide a work-
place free from "recognized hazards"); Toxic Substances Control Act (TOSCA), 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-54 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) (regulation and testing of potentially toxic
chemicals); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.A. § 136
(West 1980 & Supp. 1988) (regulation of pesticides).
' The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
9601 - 9675) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter CERCLA].
" See Violet v. Picillo, 613 F. Supp. 1563, 1571 (D.C.R.I. 1985). The court summarized
CERCLA's legislative intent: "Calling waste generators to account for the consequences
flowing from the disposal of their toxic waste products ... represents a congressional deci-
sion to look for compensation to those economic actors who have participated in, and ben-
efited from, an industry historically pervaded by irresponsible practices at various levels in
the chain of disposal .... ." Id. See also Administration's Reluctance to Sue Helps Make
Superfund Public Works Program, Kaufman Says, [17 Current Developments] Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1020 (Oct. 31, 1986). Kaufman, former chief investigator of EPA's Hazardous
Waste Division, stated: "Congress hoped the original law would force major polluters to
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scheme created to finance the Superfund.5 However, this rationale
was put in question by the enactment of the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA);' which signifi-
cantly increased the Superfund7 and correspondingly recognized
the "societal nature" of the cleanup problem.8 While the possible
change in CERCLA's theory is consistent with the policy to pro-
tect the environment and human life, it conflicts with the rights of
innocent landowners who may be held liable for cleanup under
CERCLA.9
change their waste management practices and that the threat of strict, joint and several
liability would make [them] move to clean up their own sites voluntarily . " Id.
The original intent of Congress to impose liability on those who profited from or created
the hazardous waste is manifested by CERCLA's taxing system. CERCLA imposes a tax on
oil, petrochemical feed stocks, chemicals and hazardous waste thereby shifting the burden
to the industries and consumers who benefit directly from products and services related to
the waste. See 126 CONG. REC. 14964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). See also Marzulla, Keynote
Address 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 103501 (Sept., 1988). CERCLA is a sophisticated
taxing system, wherein Congress made the choice that the responsibility for cleaning up
hazardous waste rests upon those who profited from or created those sites. Id. at 10351.
1 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9631 (1983), repealed by SARA, § 517(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9631
(West Supp. 1988). The taxing system is financed the Hazardous Substance Response Trust
Fund ("Superfund"), which was designed to subsidize cleanup costs when responsible par-
ties were unknown, unable or unwilling to reimburse the government for expenses. Id. The
tax dollars which comprise the Superfund were not derived from the general public, but
rather from those industries that are related to the creation of waste. See S. REP. No. 73,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985). See supra note 4. See also D. Hayes & C. MacKerron,
Superfund II: A New Mandate, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA Special Report) No. 42, at 84-85 (Feb.
13, 1987) (fund was created by special tax levied on chemical and petroleum industries).
6 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675) (West Supp. 1988) [hereinafter
SARA].
See New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 302 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (original
fund not sufficient to rectify existing problem). See also D. Hayes & C. MacKerron, supra
note 5, at 9. The initial $1.6 billion Superfund monies were inadequate; SARA increased
the Superfund to $8.5 billion over five years. Id. Congress financed the increase by impos-
ing a $2.5 billion dollar tax on business income and sharply increasing the tax on petro-
leum. Id.
" See S. REP. No. 73, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985) (fund is now financed by taxing
general fund subsidies). See also D. Hayes & C. MacKerron, supra note 5, at 84-85;
Schwenke, Environmental Liabilities Imposed on Landowners, Tenants, and Lenders - How Far
Can And Should They Extend?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10361, 10362 (Sept. 1988)
(arguing that SARA made policy change by broadening tax base).
' See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a). This conflict was noted in CERCLA's
legislative history:
At the heart of the Superfund ... are many complex legal and judicial issues that
reflect the tensions inherent in the Act itself: first, the need for the effective and
speedy clean-up of hazardous waste sites in order to protect human life and the envi-
ronment; second, the need to protect the interests and rights of those affected by
these sites in obtaining effective and speedy clean-ups; and third, the need to protect
Landowner Liability
This Note examines CERCLA's scope of landowner liability, the
innocent landowner defense and the effect of the defense on real
estate transactions. Part I explores the circumstances that led to
the enactment of CERCLA. Part II provides an overview of CER-
CLA. Part III examines the broad realm of landowner liability for
cleanup and Part IV considers whether the landowner may qualify
for the third party defense and thereby escape liability. Finally,
Part V highlights the impact of the innocent landowner defense
on real estate transactions. This Note concludes that, if courts
continue to expand owner liability, the third party defense should
be interpreted so as to render innocence a defense. In this way,
the conflicting policies of the Act will be reconciled by precepts of
fairness.
I. BACKGROUND
Congress first addressed the hazardous waste problem by enact-
ing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA).'0 RCRA regulates the movement of hazardous waste
from its inception to disposal, "cradle-to-grave". 11 While RCRA
provides a management scheme for hazardous waste, its major
weakness is that it applies prospectively and fails to address the
problem of existing hazardous waste sites."
the interests and rights of those who may be held liable for such cleanups.
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.3, at 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3038 (emphasis added). See Moskowitz & Hoyt, Enforcement of CERCLA Against
Innocent Owners of Property, 19 Loy. LA.L. REV. 1171, 1187-88 (1986) (suggesting congres-
sional intent supports the view that innocent owners are exempt from liability under CER-
CLA, but "knowing" owners are liable). See generally Note, Hazardous Waste and the Inno-
cent Purchaser, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 253 (1986) (analysis of landowner liability).
"0 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6991(i) (West 1983 and Supp. 1988)
[hereinafter RCRA].
" See I D. STEVER, LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE, § 5.01, 5-6
(1988). RCRA is designed for the following purposes: 1) to provide a system for tracking
and preserving a record of hazardous waste movement from its inception to disposal ("cra-
dle-to-grave"); 2) to ensure disposal is accomplished so as to prevent escape of hazardous
waste into the environment; and 3) to provide an enforcement mechanism to ensure com-
pliance with the regulations. Id. at 5-7. See generally 2 S. COOKE, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY AND LITIGATION, § 9.01 (1987) (overview of
RCRA).
"' See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120. "Since enactment of [RCRA], a major new source of environ-
mental concern has surfaced: the tragic consequences of improperly, negligently, and reck-
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The threat of release of hazardous substances from abandoned
waste sites and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) cor-
responding inability to force cleanup under RCRA was exempli-
fied by the Love Canal catastrophe.1" Congress was prompted to
address the gaps in the regulatory scheme as a result of height-
ened public consciousness of the harm to human health and envi-
ronment. 4 In 1980, CERCLA was enacted to establish a federal
program for addressing cleanup of inactive hazardous waste
sites. 6 In particular, CERCLA grants the EPA emergency re-
sponse authority and imposes liability on potentially responsible
lessly hazardous waste disposal practices known as the 'inactive hazardous waste site prob-
lem'. . . . Existing law is clearly inadequate to deal with this massive problem." Id. See also
United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.NJ. 1981) (RCRA was intended to
prevent future harm, not cure past ills), affd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
11 See United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y.
1988). Over a period of 11 years, more than 21,000 tons of various wastes were deposited
into the Love Canal. Id. Hazardous substances were found in homes in the Love Canal area
in upstate New York, resulting in myriad health effects. See [16 Current Developments]
Env't Rep. (BNA) at 7 (May 3, 1985). See also Comment, The Threat to Investment in the
Hazardous Waste Industry: An Analysis of Individual and Corporate Shareholder Liability under
CERCLA, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 585, 586 n.5 (1987); Glass, The Modern Snake in the Grass: An
Examination of Real Estate and Commercial Liability Under Superfund and Sara and Suggested
Guidelines for the Practitioner, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 381, 383 (1987) (residents of Love
Canal were unable to force cleanup of the toxic site or to recover damages for personal
and property injury). See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1980) (legislative inter-
pretation of events at Love Canal). The victims of Love Canal are still afflicted by the
tragedy ten years later. See Wall St. Journal, March 9, 1989, at I col. 1.
Love Canal was not, however, an isolated tragedy. See New York v. General Elec. Co.,
592 F. Supp. 291, 296 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). See also S. COOKE, supra note 11, at § 12.02(2)
(discussion of abandoned hazardous waste site problem).
" See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6125. See also supra note 12 (RCRA did not deal with inactive hazard-
ous waste sites).
15 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). CERCLA's intent is to
protect the environment and public health from the dangers of hazardous waste sites. See S.
REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1980). See generally Grad, A Legislative History of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. (1982) (examination of CERCLA's legislative history). Accord N.Y.
ENVT'L CONSERV. LAw (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1989) § 27-1301 (New York's version of
"Superfund").
" See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6119. The Act provides authority to respond to releases of hazardous waste;
establishes a fund to pay for cleanup; provides guidelines to impose liability; and establishes
prohibitions and requirements concerning inactive hazardous waste sites. Id. See New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985) (CERCLA applies primarily to
abandoned sites and emergency responses to spills). See also Comment, supra note 13;
Glass, supra note 13, at 386-88.
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persons for the costs of its activities.1" Due to CERCLA's hasty
enactment, which caused many statutory ambiguities"e, and the
termination of the funding of the Superfund,1 9 Congress reauth-
orized CERCLA in 1986 by the enactment of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).20 While
SARA preserved CERCLA's basic liability scheme2 1 it substan-
tially amended and expanded the Act. 2
1" See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6131. It is stated that: "[Elmergency action will often be required prior
to the receipt of evidence which conclusively establishes an emergency. Because delay will
often exacerbate an already serious situation, [CERCLA] authorizes [the EPA] to take ac-
tion when an imminent and substantial endangerment [to public health or the environ-
ment] may exist." Id. (emphasis in original). See generally D. STEVER, supra note 11, §
6.04[1], at 6-41; S. COOKE, supra note 11, § 12.02(4], at 12-17.
11 See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("CERCLA is ... a hastily drawn piece of compromise legisla-
tion, marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions . . . . [Niumerous important
features were deleted during the closing hours of the Congressional session . . . . The
courts are once again placed in the undesirable and onerous position of construing inade-
quately drawn legislation."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J.
1983) ("Because of the haste with which CERCLA was enacted, Congress was not able to
provide a clarifying committee report, thereby making it extremely difficult to pinpoint the
intended scope of the legislation."); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (CERCLA is a reflection of the hasty compromises which were reached). See also
D. Hayes & C. MacKerron, supra note 5, at 23 (CERCLA did not address standard of
liability, causal link or relative liability of the parties).
Congress affirmed many of the judicial interpretations when it reauthorized CERCLA in
1986. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess, pt. 3, at 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3038 (congressional acknowledgement of criticism of CERCLA and
the resulting litigation to define CERCLA's ambiguous provisions). See also D. Hayes & C.
MacKerron, supra note 5, at 26.
"' See CERCLA 42 U.S.C.A. § 9633(c)(2)(D)(1983). CERCLA was scheduled to expire
on September 30, 1985.
0 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675) (West Supp. 1988).
" See D. Hayes & C. MacKerron, supra note 5, at 26 Congress did not expressly incorpo-
rate liability concepts in SARA, but reaffirmed the court-confirmed rules of strict, joint and
several liability. Id. See also 132 CONG. REc. H. 9563 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986). Representative
Dingell stated: "The courts have established, as a matter of federal common law, that the
liability of potentially responsible parties at Superfund sites is strict, joint and several, un-
less the responsible parties can demonstrate that the harm is divisible." Id.
" See D. Hayes & C. MacKerron, supra note 5. The statute gives the EPA broader power
and seeks to accelerate cleanup and encourage settlements. Id. Some of the major modifica-
tions are: 1) increased funding to $8.5 billion over five years; 2) establishment of cleanup
schedules and standards; 3) creation of mechanisms to encourage settlements, including
"covenant not to sue" from the government for settling parties and "mixed funding" solu-
tions; 4) creation of an innocent landowner defense; 5) definition of statute of limitations;
6) creation of right to know provisions establishing reporting obligations; 7) increased state
role, and others. This list is not exhaustive and is only intended to illustrate some of the
153
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II. STATUTORY OVERVIEW - CERCLA
A. The Mechanics of CERCLA
To implement CERCLA's goal of protecting the environment
and human health, CERCLA establishes standards and procedures
for cleanup of hazardous waste and authorizes the EPA to organ-
ize and conduct CERCLA cleanup.2" Cleanup is governed by the
National Contingency Plan, which sets forth the standards and
procedures for responding to releases of hazardous substances,
24
major revisions. See generally D. STEVER, supra note 11, § 6.04[21, at 6-44.1 to 6-46 (sum-
mary of SARA provisions); S. COOKE, supra note 11, § 12.05[2], at 12-97 to 12-106 (over-
view of significant changes by SARA).
These amendments were intended to accelerate cleanup. See [17 Current Developments]
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 32, 1294 (Dec. 5, 1986). However, a recent report by the Congres-
sional Office of Technology Assessment concluded that EPA's cleanup program is "largely
ineffective and inefficient." See also Update, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 17 (BNA)
Uune 20, 1988).
S CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a) (West Supp. 1988). CERCLA expressly au-
thorizes the President with cleanup responsibility and to take removal or remedial action:
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial
threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial
threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may
present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the
President is authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to re-
move or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal
from any contaminated natural resource), or take any other response measure con-
sistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems necessary to
protect the public health or welfare or the environment. When the President deter-
mines that such action will be done properly and promptly by the owner or operator
of the facility or vessel or by any other responsible party, the President may allow
such person to carry out the action, conduct the remedial investigation, or conduct
the feasibility study in accordance with section 9622 of this title. No remedial inves-
tigation or feasibility study (RI/FS) shall be authorized except on a determination by
the President that the party is qualified to conduct the RI/FS and only if the Presi-
dent contracts with or arranges for a qualified person to assist the President in over-
seeing and reviewing the conduct of such RI/FS and if the responsible party agrees
to reimburse the Fund for any cost incurred by the President under, or in connec-
tion with, the oversight contract or arrangement. In no event shall a potentially re-
sponsible party be subject to a lesser standard of liability, receive preferential treat-
ment, or in any other way, whether direct or indirect, benefit from any such
arrangements as a response action contractor, or as a person hired or retained by
such a response action contractor, with respect to the release or facility in question.
The President shall give primary attention to those releases which the President
deems may present a public health threat.
Id.
The President's authority was delegated to the EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3
C.F.R. 169 (1982), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615.
"I See CERCLA § 105(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(a) (West 1983 and Supp. 1988). The Na-
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and which requires the EPA to prioritize cleanup sites on the Na-
tional Priorities List, based upon their risk to the public health
and environment."5 CERCLA provides two methods to accomplish
cleanup. If the President determines that there is "an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare of
the environment," he is authorized to order an abatement" or
use the Superfund to clean up the site to remedy the problem '
and later sue responsible parties to recover expenses.' 8
B. Standard of Liability
CERCLA as originally enacted did not specify the standard of
liability applicable to potentially responsible persons (PRPs), the
causal link that must be established between the site and the PRP
or the relative liability of PRPs. 9 However, courts have uniformly
ruled that CERCLA establishes strict liability,"0 subject only to the
tional Contingency Plan is codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300 (1985). See also Gaba, Recovering
Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: The Private Cause of Action Under CERCLA, 13 EcoLOGY L.Q
181 (1986) (explanation of the mechanisms of National Contingency Plan). See generally
Brown, Superfund and the National Contingency Plan: How Dirty is "Dirty"? How Clean is
"Clean"?, 12 EcoLory L.Q. 89 (1984) (standards of "clean" under CERCLA).
, CERCLA § 105(a)(8)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (West Supp. 1988). See S. COOKE,
supra note 11, § 12.02[4] at 12-17 (1987) (National Priorities List initially contained 400
sites and was expected to include over 2500 sites in 1988).
CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(a) (1983). This authority has been delegated
by the President to the EPA. See supra note 23 for statutory text.
" CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). See supra note 23 for
part of statutory text.
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1988). See infra note 38 for
statutory text.
In addition, a state may voluntarily agree to assume the role of the EPA within the state
and be entitled to reimbursement of response costs. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
CERCLA also encourages private parties to clean up by allowing recovery of response
costs against "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs) or Superfund. See CERCLA §
107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1988). The private party need not
obtain federal or state approval of the party's response actions or cost recovery suit. See
Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc. ("Wickland II"), 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir.
1986); NL Industries v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).
" See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984)
("CERCLA does no more than declare who is liable .... [It] gives no guidance on how to
solve the problem of comingling, or whether liability should be apportioned based on the
volume or toxicity of the waste, or how liability is to be apportioned between owners, oper-
ators, transporters and generators.").
o See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982). Courts have construed § 311 of the
Clean Water Act to impose strict liability. See, e.g., United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing
Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981); Burgess v. M/V
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narrow defenses of § 107(b).31 Courts have also imposed CERCLA
liability without proof of causation for owners of the contami-
nated site. 2 Moreover, courts on their own initiative"3 have gen-
Tomano, 564 F.2d 964, 982 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978). Section
101(32) of CERCLA provides that liability under CERCLA is subject to the same standard
as liability arising under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act. Therefore, strict liability has
been applied to CERCLA. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d, 1032, 1042 (2d
Cir. 1985) ("Section 9601(32) provides that 'liability' under CERCLA 'shall be construed
to be the standard of liability under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, which courts have
held to be strict liability.' "); Vermont v. Staco Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831 (D.Vt. 1988)
(Section 107 imposes strict liability on owners); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
cal & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affid in part and rev'd in part,
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Price, 577
F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.N.J. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. 572 F. Supp. 802,
805 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (intent of Congress was to impose strict liability); United States v.
Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 793 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem.
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
" See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (1983) (no liability if damages were
caused solely by an act of God; an act of war; or an act or omission of a third party). See
also infra note 104 for statutory text of § 107(b)(3).
31 See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044 (court held causation is not required to establish
liability of owner/operator under § 9607(a)(1)); Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. Dow
Chem. Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1113 (1984), (stating mere ownership of facil-
ity at the time of waste disposal renders owners/operators liable under § 9607(a)(2), recon.
denied, 21 ERC 1584 (1984); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060-61
(C.D. Cal. 1987) (causation not prerequisite to liability). See also Note, Developments in the
Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1520 (1986).
When the defendant is a generator, proof of causation is required, although minimal
evidence will satisfy this requirement. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D.
Pa. 1983). The court provided a causation test: "The statute appears to impose liability on
a generator who has: 1) disposed of its hazardous substance 2) at a facility which now con-
tains hazardous substances of the sort disposed of by the generator 3) if there is a release of
that or some other type of hazardous substance 4) which causes the incurrence of response
costs." Id. at 1333. See also D. Hayes & C. MacKerron, supra note 5, at 24 (Congress sig-
nalled its intent to apply a loose causation test when evaluating a defendant's connection
with the site); Note, supra note 32, at 1524 (weak causation test is best compromise be-
tween imposing liability and rapid cleanup).
"8 See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. at
845 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (substantial danger posed by site was result of defendants acting to-
gether and therefore they are jointly and severally liable); New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp.
1249, 1254 (S.D. I11. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1337 (E.D. Pa.
1983); 572 F. Supp. at 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Chem-Dyne is the leading case that established
that joint and several liability is appropriate due to the difficulty in demonstrating "a rea-
sonable basis for division according to the contribution of each" since wastes have comin-
gled. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811 (289 generators and transporters contributed waste).
See also Garber, Federal Common Law of Contribution Under the 1986 CERCLA Amendments,
14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365, 368-70 (1987) (joint and several liability effectuates intent of Con-
gress). But see Price, Dividing the Cost of Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups Under Superfunds: Is
Joint and Several Liability Appropriate?, 52 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV. 339 (1984) (author suggests
apportioned liability is the better approach).
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erally agreed that the relative liability of PRPs for hazardous
waste cleanup may be joint and several. 4
C. Liable Parties - Section 107
Liability under §107 of CERCLA is imposed on potentially re-
sponsible persons for releases8 or threatened releases36 of hazard-
ous substances."7
Section 107(a) identifies four categories of potentially responsi-
ble persons: (1) current owners or operators of hazardous waste
facilities; (2) past owners or operators of hazardous waste facilites
at the time of disposal; (3) persons who arranged for disposal of
hazardous substances; and (4) persons who accepted hazardous
substances for transport."8
" Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811 (joint and several liability should be applied on a case-
by-case basis when the harm is indivisible).
A significant addition to CERCLA is Section 113(0(1) which creates a statutory right of
contribution among responsible persons liable under Section 107(a) or under Section 106.
See CERCLA § 113(o, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0 (West Supp. 1988). See also AT&T v.
Chateaugay Corp., 88 Bankr. 581 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (when a party's right to contri-
bution arises). However, there are two exceptions to this right of contribution. The first is
that any party that enters into an administrative or judicially approved settlement agree-
ment cannot be subject to contribution claims. See CERCLA § 113(0(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §
9613(0(2) (West Supp. 1988). See also Smith Land & Improvements Corp. v. Celotex Corp.,
851 F.2d 86, 87 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3471 (1989). Secondly, a defend-
ant may not seek contribution when it knowingly and willfully participated in an illegal
dumping of hazardous waste. See United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 910-911 (E.D.
N.C. 1985).
" See CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(22) (West Supp. 1988). CERCLA broadly
defines releases to include: "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (in-
cluding the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles
containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) . . . " Id.
" See CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West Supp. 1988). The term "threatened
release" is not defined by the Act.
"' See CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West Supp. 1988). CERCLA defines
hazardous substances broadly by reference to other environmental statutes. Id. It specifi-
cally excludes from the definition petroleum, natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natu-
ral gas, synthetic gas and mixtures of natural and synthetic gas. Id.
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1988). Potentially responsible
parties are defined as follows:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or en-
tity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
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Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 4: 149, 1988
While the list of liable persons is constantly expanded by the
courts,39 CERCLA liability has been held to reach past and pre-
sent owners, operators, transporters and generators.4
D. Affirmative Defenses
Section 107(b) provides three limited defenses to CERCLA's
broad liability scheme. A potentially responsible person may avoid
liability if, by a preponderance of the evidence,41 a party can
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such
a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
Id.
New York State "Superfund" is to be distinguished because the categories of potentially
responsible parties are not clear. S. M. Turner, Remarks at seminar co-sponsored by the
Environmental Law Section and the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the
NYSBA (Dec. 15, 1988). Id. Liability seems to attach to any owner in the chain of title.
Furthermore, a "person" under CERCLA is defined as "an individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Gov-
ernment, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." See CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21) (West Supp. 1988).
" See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494
(1986) (bankruptcy trustee may not abandon hazardous waste site), reh'g denied, 475 U.S.
1090 (1986); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986) (shareholder/corporate officer liable for arranging for disposal of waste),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 759 F.2d 1032, 1052
(2d Cir. 1985) (shareholder/director of company owning hazardous waste site is liable);
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (lender who
foreclosed and held title to hazardous waste sites for four years liable as owner).
4 See, e.g., Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (present owner); United States v. A & F Materials
Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. I1. 1984) (past generators); United States v. Reilly Tar
and Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) (prior owner). Compare United States
v. Ottati & Gross, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985) (operator of hazardous waste
processing business) with Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp.
651 (N.D. I1. 1988) (chemical suppliers not owners or operators of facility without evi-
dence of requisite control over disposal process).
" See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.N.J. 1983) (defendants bear
burden of proof for affirmative defense).
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prove that the release or threatened release and the resulting
damage were caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or the
act or omission of a third party unrelated to defendant." Virtually
no court has accepted the act of God or act of war defense's and,
therefore, the "third party" defense seemed to be most viable.
However, courts have denied the defense when the defendant has
had any "contractual relationship" with the third party." SARA,
by defining the term "contractual relationship," created what is
known as the "innocent landowner defense." '45 The definition
provides that a landowner who acquires the property after dispo-
sal of hazardous substances, without knowing or having reason to
know of the hazardous substances, may have a defense under
§ 107(b)(3)."" To be successful, the landowner must comply with
the duty of care set forth in § 101(35)(B), which requires the land-
owner to make "all appropriate inquiry" into the previous owner-
ship and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or
customary practices at the time of transfer and in light of the
" CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (1983). See infra note 104 for statutory
text.
13 See, e.g., Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986) (fire caused by
lightning not "act of God"); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (heavy rains not "act of God").
" See New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). An infor-
mal agreement with a transporter does not relieve a generator from liability, even if a
transporter delivered the waste to an unauthorized site. Id. See also Shore Realty, 759 F.2d
1032 (third party defense is unavailable to almost all who raise it). But see 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(b)(3) (1983) (expressly excludes contractual relationships with railroads).
4. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 1988). The term con-
tractual relationship includes, but is not limited to:
[L]and contracts, deeds, or other instruments transferring title or possession, unless
the real property . . . was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement
of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circum-
stances described in clause (i), (ii) or (iii) is also established by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know
and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject
of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by es-
cheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through
the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that
he has satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of this title.
Id.
46 Id.
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landowner's specialized knowledge or expertise. "7
Due to the high standards of due diligence and the inquiry into
the landowner's specialized knowledge or expertise, the "innocent
landowner defense" is applicable to a small class of defendants.'
Additionally, if a previous owner is liable under the Act, it cannot
rely on this defense"4 and previous owners who transfer owner-
" CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988) provides:
To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause (i) of
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at the
time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of
the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to
minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into
account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the
relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated,
commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the
obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and
the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
Id.
48 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 187, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3276, 3280 (emphasizes the limited circumstances of the availability
of the third party defense). However, if the landowner fails to meet the burden of proof to
qualify for the third-party defense, the "almost innocent" owner may qualify as a de
minimis settling party. See CERCLA § 122(g)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(g)(1)(B) (West Supp.
1988). This provision allows settlement with owners who did not permit disposal nor con-
tribute to a release nor have actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous substances.
See also D. Hayes & C. MacKerron, supra note 5, at 55 (expeditious settlement for party
contributing small amounts of hazardous substances, or "innocent" owners that did not
contribute to releases).
In addition, an innocent owner may also have remedies against prior owners and respon-
sible parties. CERCLA, as amended, authorizes any party who has incurred response costs
to recover those costs from other responsible persons. See SARA § 206. See also Wickland
Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986) (governmentally author-
ized cleanup was not prerequisite to private action to recover response costs). Compare Cad-
illac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988) (prior fed-
eral, state or local government action is not a prerequisite to a private party's action for
response costs) with Ohio v. United States EPA, 838 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (private
claims against the Superfund for response costs requires prior EPA authorization). But see
United States v. Freeman, 680 F. Supp. 73, 79 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (11th Amendment bars
suits by private parties against state in federal court for contribution claims under CER-
CLA). See generally Connolly, Successor Landowner Suits For Recovery of Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Costs: CERCLA § 107(aX4), 33 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1737 (1986) (recovery of cleanup
costs).
" CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1988). The statute
provides:
(C) Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall diminish the
liability of any previous owner or operator of such facility who would otherwise be
liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the defendant obtained
actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at
such facility when the defendant owned the real property and then subsequently
transferred ownership of the property to another person without disclosing such
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ship with knowledge of the release, without disclosing such infor-
mation are fully liable under § 107(a)(1) and precluded from as-
serting the landowner defense."
III. SCOPE OF LANDOWNER LIABILITY FOR CLEANUP COSTS
In furtherance of CERCLA's policy to protect the environment,
courts have concluded that CERCLA's definition of "owner" 5 ex-
tends to: a) present owners, despite their innocence;5" b) past own-
ers who were owners at the time of disposal,53 or who acted as a
conduit in the transfer of title but retained control and interest;5
and c) successor owners.5 5 Judicial interpretations have made it
knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as liable under section 9607(a)(1) of this
title and no defense under section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall be available to such
defendant.
Id.
Id.
"' CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (20)(A) (West Supp. 1988) defines "owner
or operator" as:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise,
such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person
owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control
of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinqency, abandon-
ment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who
owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately be-
forehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect
his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id.
It is necessary to distinguish CERCLA §101(20)(D), which excludes from the term
.owner or operator," "a unit of State or local government which acquired ownership or
control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circum-
stances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as sov-
ereign." Id. (emphasis added). See United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir.
1988). South Carolina Department of Health & Environment Control was found not to be
an "owner or operator" by virtue of its oversight and limited regulatory activities at the
site. Id. at 146. There was no evidence of "hands on" activities. Id.
"' See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (current
owner strictly liable); United States v. Cauffman, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2167, 2168
(1984) (same).
" See CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988). See also Arte-
sian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (D. Del.
1987), a'd on appeal, 851 F.2d 643 (1988) (CERCLA includes as covered persons former
owners and operators who owned or operated facility at time of hazardous waste disposal).
" See United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2128 (D.S.C.
1984) (chemical company which held title for one hour was held an owner).
" See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1045. Successor owners are liable; otherwise waste sites
would be sold following the cessation of dumping, to new owners who could avoid liability
under CERCLA. Id. See also Cauffman, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. at 2168 (current owners as well
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clear that to impose § 107(a) liability on an owner of contaminated
property, the only requirement is ownership." Therefore, the rel-
ative "innocence" of an owner is irrelevant under CERCLA's lia-
bility scheme. 7 An owner who is found liable under CERCLA is
required to pay for the cleanup, even if the cost exceeds the value
of the land.5"
CERCLA's policy to protect the environment found in §107(a)
conflicts with its policy to protect the rights of innocent landown-
ers found in §107(b). In an effort to reconcile these competing
policies, the following subsections examine the broad categories of
as former owners at time of disposal are strictly liable); United States v. Carolawn Co., 21
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2130 (owners of site are liable). Recently, two courts have found
corporate successor liability. See Smith Land & Improvements Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851
F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1988) (corporate successor liability is appropriate in CERCLA contri-
bution claims), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3471 (1989); T & E Industries v. Safety Light
Corp., 680 F. Supp 696, 709 (D.N.J. 1988) (corporate successor to responsible party held
liable to subsequent innocent purchaser for response costs).
" See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044 (Section 107(a) imposes strict liability on current
owner, without regard to causation); Artesian Water Co., 659 F. Supp. at 1277 (court ob-
served that other courts have uniformly imposed strict liability for § 107(a) owners); United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986). See also D.
Hayes & C. MacKerron, supra note 5, at 28.
" See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1039 (owner was aware of hazardous waste and of contin-
ued dumping after it took title); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp.
1135, 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (court implied that despite the city-owner's innocence, it was a
potentially responsible party). Shore Realty and Stepan can be distinguished from the truly
"innocent" owner cases where a party acquires property after disposal of hazardous waste
without knowledge. See McGregor, Landowner Liability for Hazardous Waste, 4 THE JOURNAL
OF REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT 13 (1989) (landowners liable even if they purchased land
innovently). See generally Moskowitz & Hoyt, supra note 9 (author distinguishes an "inno-
cent" owner from a "knowing" owner).
See D. Hayes & C. MacKerron, supra note 5 (liability under CERCLA, as amended, is
extensive). Liability for response costs is limited to the total response costs plus $50 million
for any damages. See CERCLA § 107(c)(1)(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c)(1)(D) (West & Supp.
1988). The EPA may also assess civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation. See CERCLA
§ 109(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9609(a) (West Supp. 1988). "Class I administrative penalty" may
be imposed for violations of reporting required under § 103, violations of financial respon-
sibility required under § 108, violations of orders under § 122(d)(3) and for failures or
refusals relating to violations of administrative orders, consent decrees or agreements
under § 120. Id. Moreover, under § 109(a) an additional $25,000 penalty can be assessed
for each day the violation continues, and up to $75,000 per day for second or subsequent
violations. See CERCLA § 109(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9609(b) "Class II administrative penalty"
(West Supp. 1988).
For suggestions on how to minimize liability, see generally Rosenblatt and Brand, Han-
dling Hazardous Waste: A Case Study 30 (WG & L Real Estate Outlook), vol. 11 No. I (Spring
1988); M. Baker, Tainted Property: Hazardous Substances, Hazardous Waste and Asbestos in
Real Property Transactions (NYSBA Course Materials Dec. 15, 1988); Fitzsimmons & Sher-
wood, The Real Estate Lawyer's Primer (And More) to Superfund: The Environmental Hazards of
Real Estate Transactions, 22 REAL PROP. PRoB. & TR. J. 765 (1987).
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owners liable under CERCLA and Part IV discusses the availabil-
ity of the innocent landowner defense.
A. Landlord and Tenant as Owner
Owners/lessors who lease the property to third parties who
thereafter cause a release or threat of release of hazardous sub-
stances are liable under §107 as "owners," regardless of the
owner's innocence or lack of knowledge of the disposal of hazard-
ous waste." Courts have interpreted the landlord-tenant contrac-
tual relationship to be a sufficient nexus to hold the landowner
liable.60 Likewise, lessees who sublease the land to a third party
are also "owners" for §107(a) purposes."1
Moreover, the term of the lease is irrelevant when the lessee
created the hazardous condition prior to the expiration of the
lease term.e"
B. Lender Liability
The definition of "owner" or "operator" specifically excludes "a
person, who, without participating in the management of a . ..
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest in the ... facility."6 " Accordingly, the lender who merely
" See, e.g., United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356 (D.N.M.
1984) (court held an owner/lessor unconnected with the lessee's business liable as "owner"
under CERCLA).
" Id. at 1356. See United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc. (SCRDI),
653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984) (oral lease between landlord and tenant is the contractual
relationship which makes landlord liable), affid in part and vacated in part, 858 F.2d 160
(4th Cir. 1988). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 379A, 837(1) (1979). At com-
mon law lessor was not liable for nuisance unless it existed at the time the premises were
leased or would arise from the ordinary use for which the property was leased. Id. See also
New York v. Monarch Chem. Inc., 90 App. Div. 2d 907, 456 N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (3d Dep't
1982) (landlord liable under nuisance theory where landlord was aware of hazardous
seepage).
' See United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1577, 1581 (sublessor of site who maintains control over and responsiblity for prop-
erty, stood in the shoes of property owner). See also Glass, supra note 13, at 420-21 (author
suggests since the tenant is entitled to exclusive use and enjoyment of premises, tenant is
an "owner").
" See CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988) (owner at time
of disposal). See also Glass, supra note 13, at 421 (since former owners may be liable for acts
during their ownership, so too can tenants be liable for acts during their tenancy even after
lease term expires).
CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1988). See supra note
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holds the mortgage is not an "owner or operator.""4 CERCLA,
however, is silent as to whether this security exception protects a
lender who takes title to the mortgaged property through foreclo-
sure or otherwise. A recent line of decisions exemplifies that the
law is not settled on the issue of when a lender becomes an owner
for purposes of CERCLA liability.65
In United States v. Mirabile,6" three financial institutions were
sued under CERCLA to recover cleanup costs of a paint manufac-
turing site.6" The court scrutinized each lender's activities to de-
51 for statutory text.
" See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6181-82. The legislative history indicates that financial institutions fall
within the exemption:
" 'Owner' is defined to include not only those persons who hold title to a vessel or
facility but those who, in the absence of holding a title, possess some equivalent evi-
dence of ownership. It does not include certain persons possessing indicia of owner-
ship (such as a financial institution) who, without participating in the management or
operation of a vessel or facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan or in
connection with a lease financing arrangement under the appropriate banking laws,
rules or regulations."
Id. at 6181.
" See United States v. Fleet Factor Corp., 17 Chem. Waste Litig. Rptr. 657, 661-62
(S.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 1989) C court held lender was not an owner or operator of facility
because of lack of control or activities at the facility). United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986) (lender who becomes owner not entitled
to § 101(20)(A) secured interest exemption); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (court looked at lender's participation in
management, not whether it held title); In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 289
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (BancOhio not liable because it held only a perfected security
interest in debtor's personal property). Many articles have been written about lender liabil-
ity under CERCLA. See, e.g., King, Lenders' Liability for Cleanup Costs, 18 ENVTL L. 241
(1988) (lenders should restrict involvement in borrower's affairs and take suggested protec-
tive measures); Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste Cleanup
Costs Under Cercla, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139 (lenders should take affirmative steps to protect
themselves from liability by not participating in management or control of borrower);
Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act on the Com-
mercial Lending Industry: A Critical Assessment, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 879 (1987) [hereinafter
"Impact of the 1986 Superfund"] (CERCLA liability will result in lenders becoming the
EPA's enforcement arm).
15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
" Id. at 20,995. The EPA brought suit against the current owners (Mirabile) who in
turn sued two private lenders, American Bank & Trust Company (ABT) and Mellon Bank
(Mellon) as third-party defendants, which financed the manufacturing plant. Id. The banks
then counterclaimed against the United States Small Business Administration (SBA) who
also made loans to the owners of the plant. Id.
The facts indicate that ABT made a loan to Arthur C. Mangels Industries, Inc. Id. at
20,996 (Mangels) which owned the paint facility. Id. at 20, 996. Mangels sold the facility to
Turco Coatings, Inc. (Turco). Id. Mellon (through its predecessor-in-interest) advanced
monies to Turco in return for a security interest in Turco's inventory and assets. Id. SBA
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termine whether the lenders were protected as secured creditors
or were liable as "owners" by the exercise of control over the
facility.
The court held that the lender (American Bank & Trust Com-
pany), which foreclosed on the property but never took title be-
cause it assigned its bid, was not liable since its involvement was
limited to participation in financial decisions and taken only to
protect its security interest."
The court further determined that the lender (Small Business
Administration) which did not hold legal or equitable title was not
liable, reasoning that the lender's involvement in the operations
was limited to purely financial aspects, even though it had author-
ity to participate in management decisions.69
However, the lender (Mellon Bank) which had a security inter-
est in inventory and accounts, was not released from potential lia-
bility because the court found a "cloudier situation" with its in-
volvement in the company's activities. 0
Another approach to lender liability is found in United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,"1 wherein the lender acquired title to
also loaned Turco capital, taking back a security interest in Turco's machinery, equipment
and inventory, a mortgage on real property and a pledge of stock. Id. Turco then filed a
petition in bankruptcy. Id. ABT foreclosed and assigned its bid to the Mirabiles. Id.
" Id. at 20,996. The court stated that in order to be liable, a lender must "at minimum
participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site." Id.
I d. at 20,997. SBA had authority to provide management assistance by virtue of loan
regulations in effect at the time of the loan. Id. at 20,996.
70 Id. at 20,997. The court denied summary judgment and required more fact finding,
suggesting that its participation in the company's affairs may have been beyond the pur-
view of financial aspects. Id.
The threshold question is what acts by the lender will constitute control and participa-
tion in management. The Fleet court significantly provided lender with some guidelines. See
Fleet, 17 Chem. Waste Litig. Rptr. at 661-62. The court stated, "I interpret the phrases
"participating in the management of a ...facility" and primarily to protect his security
interest," to permit secured creditors to provide financial assistance and general, and even
isolated instances of specific management advice to its debtors without risking CERCIA
liability if the secured creditor does not participate in the day-to-day management of the
leasing facility either before or after the business ceases operation." Id. at 661. Further,
due to the significance of these issues the court granted interlocutory appeal. Id. at 665. See
J. Levis, The Secured Lender's Duty to Clean Up a Polluted Site, N.Y.L.J. (March 9, 1989) at 5,
col. 1 (author states that this decision is not beneficial to lenders because it raises more
issues without addressing the distinction between participation in management and con-
trol). See also [19 Current Dev.] ENVTL REP. (BNA) No. 40, 2062 (Feb. 3, 1989) (highlights
of Fleet).
" 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986). The Maryland court distinguished Mirabile by
the fact that the lender who foreclosed promptly assigned its interest. Id.
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the property at a foreclosure sale."2 The court held that the
§101(20)(A) exclusion for secured creditors does not apply to a
former mortgagee who subsequently acquires title and who holds
title for four years." The court reasoned that if the lender was
held to be within the ambit of §101(20)(A), the "mortgagee-
turned-owner" would benefit from cleanup, while the government
paid the cost.7 4
The rule that emerges from Mirabile and Maryland is that credi-
tors who participate in the management of the facility beyond
purely financial involvement and lenders who become owners may
be liable under CERCLA. Commentators have argued that the
combined effect of these two cases will cause chilling liability on
the lending industry.75 This novel argument of chilling liability
was recently contended in Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-
Thomas, Inc.76 The defendants, a lending institution, developers,
71 Id. at 575. In Maryland, the bank made a loan to the McLeods who had a farm and
dealt in the garbage disposal business. Id. The McLeods allowed hazardous waste to be
dumped on their farm. Id. The McLeods' son bought the farm by a loan from the bank. Id.
The son defaulted on loan payments and the bank foreclosed and took title to the prop-
erty. Id.
7 Id. at 579.
71 Id. at 580. The Maryland court stated:
Under the scenario put forward by the bank, the federal government alone would
shoulder the cost of cleaning up the site, while the former mortgagee-turned-owner,
would benefit from the clean-up by the increased value of the now unpolluted land.
At the foreclosure sale, the mortgagee could acquire the property cheaply. All other
prospective purchasers would be faced with potential CERCLA liability, and would
shy away from the sale. Yet once the property has been cleared at the taxpayers'
expense and becomes marketable, the mortgagee-turned-owner would be in a posi-
tion to sell the site at a profit.
Id.
"' See Comment, Impact of the 1986 Superfund, supra note 65, at 900 (increased costs to
protect lenders from liability will be passed on to borrowers; causing demand for capital to
decline, resulting in stunted economic growth). See also Glass, supra note 13, at 419 (lend-
ers are forced to make economic decisions whether or not to foreclose). As a result of
possible liability, lenders will have an incentive not to foreclose and perhaps avoid loan
transactions in which a hazardous waste site is involved. Id. But see Rashby, United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 591
(1987) (extension of liability to lenders is consistent with CERCLA's policy); Note, When a
Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 1261, 1288 (1987) (risk that secured property may be less valuable than originally ex-
pected is a risk inherent in the lending transaction). See generally Fleischaker and Mitchell,
The Insecurities of Security Interests in Hazardous Waste Cases, Nat. L. J., Sept. 15, 1986, at 18,
col. 1 (discussion of risks facing foreclosing lenders).
76 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988).
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real estate and construction companies,7 argued on a motion for
summary judgment that "legislation was not meant to impose chil-
ling liability on the defendants' businesses. 71 8 The court found all
defendants potentially responsible parties, 9 without addressing
their fear of chilling liability."0 Therefore, lenders remain subject
to CERCLA liability but may find relief in the third party "inno-
cent landowner defense."81
C. Officers, Directors and Shareholders
CERCLA's definition of "persons" expressly includes corpora-
tions;82 however, the issue remains whether the corporation's
shareholders, directors and officers may be individually liable. It
has been established that an officer, director and shareholder of a
corporation may be individually liable as an "owner/operator"
under CERCLA,8" when the individual actively participated in the
control and management of the facility.8
71 Id. at 1571.
71 Id. at 1573. The defendants reasoned that CERCLA was intended to cover generators
and those persons engaged in the chemical waste industry, not those in the real estate and
lending industries. Id.
79 Id. at 1574.
80 Id. The court was "persuaded beyond peradventure that a determination of the spe-
cific businesses and activities covered by CERCLA is beyond the pale of a 12(b)(6) motion.
That remains for another day." Id.
CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A)(B) (West Supp. 1988). See supra
notes 45 and 47 for statutory text. The lender must acquire title to the property after the
disposal of hazardous waste and must have no reason to know of such disposal. Id. Further,
the lender's "appropriate inquiry" will be viewed in light of its specialized knowledge and
expertise. Id. See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 187 reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3276, 3280 ("Those engaged in commercial transactions
should, however, be held to a higher standard than those who are engaged in private resi-
dential transactions."). If the lender fails to establish the innocent landowner defense, a de
minimis settlement might be available. See CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622 (West Supp.
1988).
82 See CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21) (West Supp. 1988). See supra note 38
for statutory text.
' See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (shareholder/
officer liable under CERCLA); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 913-14 (D.N.H.
1985) (officer and sole shareholder may be individually liable under CERCLA); United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (shareholder/officer found liable as owner and operator), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v.
Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2131 (D.S.C. 1984) (corporate officers per-
sonally liable).
" See Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831-32 (D. Vt. 1988). Corporate execu-
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In United States v. Carolawn Co., 85 the court found personal lia-
bility appropriate for individuals who were responsible for the
"day-to-day" operations of hazardous waste disposal.86 The court
determined the two relevant factors to be the amount of authority
or control an individual has and his level of participation in
management.8"
In addition, courts have found corporate officers liable as own-
ers, without piercing the corporate veil, reasoning that §107(a)
read in conjunction with §311 (a)(7) of the Clean Water Act, al-
lows the imposition of liability on persons who own an interest in
a facility and are actively participating in its management.88
tives are liable as owners when they participate in the control and management of the
corporation that owned and operated the facilities. Id. at 832. See also Carolawn, 21 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2131 (relevant factors to consider before liability attaches are amount
of control and authority over site). See generally Glass, supra note 13, at 395-413 (discussion
of officer, shareholder, corporate and parent corporation liability); Comment, supra note
13, at 611. The author states:
[sihareholder liability under CERCLA is almost certain in many circumstances: for
example, when a shareholder actively arranges for or disposes of hazardous wastes,
participates in the illegal disposal of hazardous waste, or owns and operates or man-
ages a hazardous waste disposal facility. When a shareholder does not actively man-
age a site, but occupies a position of corporate responsibility, the question of poten-
tial liability is less clear.
Id.
21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984).
" Id. at 2131.
87 Id. See also Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 848. This case is significant
because the court found individual generator employees liable without piercing the corpo-
rate veil. Id. at 848-49. The court found the vice president in his individual capacity liable
because he had "actively participated" in the company's management. Id. at 849. The
court also found the president liable in his individual capacity as "owner and operator" by
virtue of his position and capacity to prevent and control unlawful disposal. Id. On appeal,
however, the Eighth Circuit, reversed holding that neither the corporation, nor its employ-
ees or officers could be liable as "owner or operator" because they did not own or operate
the Denney farm site. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986). The
president, however, was instead held strictly liable as "contributor" under RCRA §
7003(a). Id. at 745. The court found liability without distinguishing between officer or
shareholder status. Id.
This approach is also emphasized in the recent lender liability cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (level of lender's
participation is determinative); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985). See generally supra notes 63 - 81 and accompanying text for
discussion of lender liability.
" See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (sole
shareholder who controlled all corporate decisions held liable as operator/owner under
CERCLA); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 913-14 (D.N.H. 1985) (president,
treasurer and sole shareholder can be personally liable even without piercing the corporate
veil if he directed or personally participated in hazardous activity).
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D. Liability of Parent Corporation
The courts' treatment of parent corporations liability for acts of
its wholly-owned subsidiary is similar to that of individual officer/
shareholder liability. In Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co.,9 the court held a
parent company liable as an "owner or operator" under CERCLA
because it had the capacity to control disposal and had partici-
pated in the management of its subsidiary.9" However, the Bunker
court indicated that not all participation by a parent company
would invoke liability, rather a parent corporation can participate
in the "normal" activities of a parent with respect to its subsidiar-
ies." Moreover, parent liability is also found without "piercing
the corporate veil." '
E. Past Owners
CERCLA is a retroactive statute", therefore, owners or opera-
8" 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
90 Id. at 672. The Bunker court stated:
Gulf was in a position to be, and was, intimately familiar with hazardous waste dispo-
sal and releases at the Bunker Hill facility; had the capacity to control such disposal
and releases; and had the capacity, if not total reserved authority, to make decisions
and implement actions and mechanisms to prevent and abate the damage caused by
the disposal and releases of hazardous wastes at the facility . . .Gulf at times con-
trolled a majority of Bunker Hill's board of directors and Gulf obtained weekly re-
ports of day-to-day aspects of Bunker Hill operations.
Id.91 Id. The court did not define what activities are considered "normal." Attaching CER-
CLA liability to a parent of a defunct subsidiary has the additional problem of finding
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (defendant parant argued lack of personal jurisdiction). The court utilized
the Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp. test to determine whether the
parent's activities were sufficient to attach liability: (1) common ownership; (2) financial
dependency of the subsidiary on the parent; (3) interference by the parent in the selection
and assignment of the subsidiary's personnel and failure to observe corporate formalities;
and (4) degree of control exercised over the marketing and operational policies of the sub-
sidiary. Id. at 620-21. Based on this test, the Exxon court found personal jurisidiction over
the parent despite the fact that the alleged acts were made by a defunct subsidiary. Id. at
621.
" See United States v. Nicolet Turner & Newall, No. 85-3060 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (parent
corporation of subsidiary that was past owner/operator of Superfund site was liable with-
out piercing the corporate veil); Cf. State v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 502, 468 A.2d
150, 165 (1983) (parent company's corporate veil was pierced based on state law).
" See United States v. Miami Drum Services, Inc., 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,539, 20,542 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 1986) (Congress intended Act to apply retroactively);
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo. 1985) (CERCLA is by its
very nature backward looking); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
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tors who owned or operated any facility at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance remain liable." Thus, former owners
who caused release of hazardous substances cannot escape
liability,'5
and past owners who owned the property at the time of disposal
are likewise liable under CERCLA.' 6
Furthermore, past owners can be liable in private party actions
based upon a contract liability.' 7 It should be emphasized, how-
ever, that §107(e)(1) provides that liability to the Government
may not be avoided by an indemnification clause in a real estate
contract."
Prior owners who neither create nor contribute to the hazard-
Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 840 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (retroactive application of CERCLA § 106
and § 107 do not violate fifth amendment due process rights), affid in part and rev'd in part,
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
" See CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988). CERCLA
changed the common law rule that seller alone are liable for hazardous conditions until
buyer has discovered or had reasonable time to discover the condition and abate it. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 839 (1979).
9' See, e.g., United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1073 (D.N.J. 1981) (Section 7003 of
RCRA applied to prior owners whose waste disposal practices caused present day ground-
water contamination, despite sale of the property), affid 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982); T &
E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.J. 1988) (court held corporate succes-
sor to prior owner that released radium tailings at site liable to subsequent innocent pur-
chaser under CERCLA).
"See Miami Drum 17 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,542; United States v. South Carolina Re-
cycling and Disposal, Inc., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v.
Reilly Tar and Chem. Corp. 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (D. Minn. 1982) (prior owners who
owned facility at the time of disposal of hazardous waste are liable for cleanup even though
site has been sold because § 107 is absolute).
" See Nunn v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1763 (D.
Kan. 1985) (seller who warranted to buyer that land was in compliance with all laws was
liable to buyer for costs incurred in cleanup based on contract.)
" CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e)(1) (1983). However, CERCLA does not
attempt to eliminate such agreements which are effective as between the parties. See CER-
CLA § 107(e)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e)(2) (1983). Indemnification clauses not only hold a
prior owner liable but can also release the prior owner from liability to other responsible
persons. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1055-56 (D. Ariz.
1984) (purchaser signed agreement releasing seller from future liability of all claims, in-
cluding hazardous waste disposal), affd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). The Mardan Court
held that the broad release language was effective to bar all claims which the parties rea-
sonably contemplated at the time of the execution of the agreement. Id. at 1056. Pur-
chaser's claim against seller under CERCLA for cleanup was barred. Id. But see Smith Land
& Improvements Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988) (caveat emptor is not a
defense to liability for CERCLA contribution claims but may be mitigating factor), cert.
denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3471 (1989). See also [17 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA)
1337, 1338 (Dec. 12, 1986) (Section 107(e)(i) expressly allows private party agreements
concerning indemnification and release).
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ous waste site, nor owned the site at the time of disposal, but
merely held title to the land after disposal may also be held liable
under CERCLA. 9
As amended under §101(35), CERCLA 100 effectively makes all
past owners potentially liable when they knew of the existence of
the site. Thus, past owners who are owners at the time of disposal
may be liable under §107(a)10 1 and liable under §101(35)(C) for
their failure to disclose information concerning releases on the
site.1 02
IV. THIRD PARTY DEFENSE - SECTION 107(b)(3)
The broad scope of CERCLA liability under §107(a) reaches
virtually all parties to a real estate transaction, subject only to lim-
ited affirmative defenses. 08 The third party defense, as amended
by SARA, may be effective to protect the truly innocent land-
owner. However, the availability of the defense will be deter-
mined by judicial interpretation of the statute's requirement. The
following is an analysis of judicial interpretation of §107(b)(3)
prior to and after the enactment of SARA.
A. Pre-SARA case law
CERCLA § 107(b)(3) as originally enacted provides that before
an owner can be relieved of liability, he must show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the release was the sole cause of the
damage to the third party and that there was no contractual rela-
tionship with the third party. Moreover, the defendant must
prove he exercised due care and took precautions against foresee-
" See United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984)
(court held one who held title for less than one hour was liable as an "owner" under CER-
CLA). The defendant argued it was merely a conduit in the transfer of ownership, but the
court found the facts to be "cloudy" and could not say whether it was merely a conduit or
acquiring an ownership interest. Id. at 2128.
100 CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1988). See supra note
49 for statutory text.
I"' CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1988). See supra note 38 for
statutory text.
10 CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1988). See supra note
49 for statutory text.
105 See supra notes 41 - 50 and accompanying text.
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able acts.""
The statute, as originally enacted, did not define the term "con-
tractual relationship" and courts have construed the exception
broadly. For example, in United States v. South Carolina Recycling &
Disposal, Inc. (SCRDI),06 an absentee landlord/owner was held
jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs as a result of the activ-
ities of its tenants/generators. The § 107(b)(3) defense was denied
by virtue of the contractual relationship, an oral lease between the
owners and the generators. The court held that the contractual
relationship between the landlord and tenant precludes the de-
fense under any circumstances.0 6
This broad interpretation of the contractual relationship excep-
tion reduces the analysis to one step: whether any contractual rela-
tionship exists. It is suggested that the court's failure to distin-
guish the sole-cause test from the contractual relationship
exception results in the sole-cause test being an unnecessary
analysis."'
The two part analysis was, however, discussed in New York v.
10 CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) (1983). The third party defense reads
as follows:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were
caused solely by - . . .
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contrac-
tual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant . . . if the de-
fendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due
care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration
the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and cir-
cumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any
such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts
or omissions ....
Id.
105 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984), affid in part and vacated in part, 858 F.2d 160 (4th
Cir. 1988).
'" Id. at 993. The court found that "[b]ecause there is no question of the contractual
link between the landowners and SCRDI, whose liability is admitted, the landowners can-
not under any circumstances prove that the release was caused 'solely' by a third party
which did not share a contractual relationship with them." Id. (emphasis added).
'07 See Ruhl, The Third-Party Defense to Hazardous Waste Liability: Narrowing the Contrac-
tual Relationship Exception, 29 S. TEx. L. REV. 291, 301-02 (1987) (existence of the contrac-
tual relationship should not determine whether the third party was the sole cause of the
release).
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Shore Realty Corp.1"8 In this case the owner knew at the time of
acquisition that hazardous waste was stored on the site. 09 The
owner argued that it was not involved in the transportation of the
hazardous substances. The court denied the owner's affirmative
defense because: (1) the owner knew of the tenant's illegal dump-
ing of hazardous waste; and, 10 (2) a contractual relationship was
found to exist."'
The Shore court followed the mandate of the statute by comply-
ing with a two-step analysis. Since the defendant failed the sole-
cause test and its due care obligations, the court correctly denied
the third party defense." 2 However, the court then noted that a
contractual relationship existed vis-a-vis the purchase agreement
and further suggested that the language of the contract made the
defendant responsible for some environmental liability."'
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,"' the court not
only applied a two-step analysis, but suggested that a determina-
tion of the nature of the contractual relationship was required.1 5
The Maryland court held that a foreclosing mortgagee who held
title to contaminated property for four years was liable for
cleanup costs." 6 Since there was no dispute that the financial insti-
tution did not cause the release, the court analyzed the contrac-
tual relationship and concluded that genuine issues of material
fact existed as to the nature of the contractual relationship and
106 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
100 Id. at 1037.
11 Id. at 1049. The court stated: "In light of this knowledge, we cannot say that the
releases and threats of release resulting of these activities were 'caused solely' by the te-
nants or that Shore 'took precautions against' these 'foreseeable acts or omissions.' " Id.
" Id. at 1048 n.23. The court reasoned that "[wlhile we need not reach the issue,
Shore appears to have a contractual relationship with the previous owners that also blocks
the defense. The purchase agreement includes a provision by which Shore assumed at least
some of the environmental liability of the previous owners." Id.
"' See Ruhl, supra note 107, at 303-04. The Shore court acted consistently with the stat-
ute. The defense failed the sole cause test, and thus did not have to reach the contractual
relationship issue. Id.
11s Id. at 304. RuhI explains the consequences of Shore: "Shore Realty thus illustrated that
the third party defense can remain narrow enough to serve the enforcement purposes of
CERCLA and simultaneously be applied in a sensible, orderly and fair manner." Id.
14 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). See supra notes 71-75.
118 Id. at 581.
116 Id.
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the extent of the bank's due care." 7
The Maryland court's query into the "nature of the contractual
relationship" suggests that the element of control is an appropri-
ate part of the contractual relationship test.118
B. Post-SARA case law
The SARA amendments defined the term "contractual relation-
ship" for purposes of § 107(b)(3)." 9 This definition adds elements
that the defendant must establish in order to qualify for the
§107(b)(3) defense. 20 First, the release must occur prior to de-
fendant's ownership. Second, defendant must show that he did
not know and had no reason to know of the existence of the haz-
ardous substances on the site. 2 ' To establish that defendant had
no reason to know, defendant must undertake "all appropriate in-
quiry" into the condition of the property consistent with good
commercial practice at the time of purchase. 2 The statute ex-
presses specific factors a court may consider when determining
whether the inquiry was appropriate. 2
I1 ld. (decision left the availability of § 107(b)(3) defense open).
18 See Ruhl, supra note 107, at 304 (Maryland case is the broadest interpretation of third
party defense thus far).
... See CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 1988). See also
supra note 45 for statutory text.
CERCLA was amended to "clarify and confirm that under limited circumstances land-
owners who acquire property without knowing of any contamination at the site and with-
out reason to know of any contamination ... may have a defense to liability under Section
107. ... See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3276, 3279.
11" See Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257, 1261 (D.N.J.
1987). To prevail on the innocent landowner defense, owner must prove it exercised due
care and took precautions against foreseeable consequences of a third party. Id. at 1261
n.3. See also M. Baker, The Impact of Environmental Law on Real Estate and Commercial Trans-
actions (NYSBA Course Materials) at 152 (Dec. 15, 1988) (requirements of § 107(b)(3)(a) &
(b) must also be met).
"1 See CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 1988). See supra
note 45 for statutory text.
122 CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988). See supra note
47 for statutory text.
The availability of the defense is further restricted by § 101(35)(C) which precludes own-
ers who transfer property, after learning of release, without disclosing such information.
See CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C)(West Supp. 1988). See also supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
121 See CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988). Congress
specified that the specialized knowledge and experience of the purchaser, the relationship
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Consequently, while SARA assists the courts in determining
whether a contractual relationship exists, the utility of the inno-
cent landowner defense depends upon judicial interpretation of
whether the due diligence requirements were met and whether
the element of control should exist in the contractual relation-
ship."" The following three recent cases have attempted to clarify
the availability of the innocent landowner defense.
In United States v. Monsanto Co.,"'8 the court denied the third
party defense holding the owners liable under § 107(a). Since the
owners were unaware of the release of hazardous substances by
their tenants until a toxic cloud formed at the site,"'6 the owners
argued that "they were innocent absentee landlords unaware of
and unconnected to the waste disposal activities that took place on
their land." 2 ' The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dis-
agreed and found the defendant/owners to be within the class of§ 107(a)(2) owners, regardless of their degree of participation." 8
Specifically, the court found that the defendants failed the sole-
cause and due care elements of § 107(b)(3), 9 as they had "knowl-
edge" of the presence of hazardous substances and failed to take
"precautionary action against the foreseeable conduct of COCC
or SCRDI." 30
Although the Monsanto court correctly denied the affirmative
defense based upon the owners' knowledge, an aspect of the sole
of the purchase price of the property to the market value if uncontaminated, any com-
monly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, and the obvi-
ousness of the contamination must be taken into consideration in determining whether the
inquiry was appropriate. Id.
12 See Ruhl, supra note 107, at 308. SARA provides little guidance as to the degree of
control a contractual relationship must have to fall within the scope of § 107(b)(3). Id. See
also Baker, supra note 120, at 154 (defense depends upon judicial interpretation of what
buyers know or should have known).
" 858 F. 2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (appellate decision of SCRDI). In 1972 the owners
verbally leased warehouse space to Columbia Organic Chemical Company (COCC). Id. at
164. In 1976 the principals of COCC incorporated South Carolina Recycling & Disposal
Inc. (SCRDI) to assume its waste-handling business and defendant/owners accepted rent
from SCRDI. Id. SCRDI deposited a majority of the waste at the facility. Id.
.. Id. (it was not until 1977 that the owners became aware of tenant's activities).
"' Id. at 166.
"u Id. at 168. The court noted, however, that the degree of fault may be considered in a
contributory action. Id. at 168 n.13.
129 Id. at 169.
1 0 Id. The court held that the "statute does not sanction such willful or negligent blind-
ness on the part of absentee owners." Id.
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third party cause and due care elements, the ambiguity of the na-
ture of the contractual relationship was still not clarified. In fact,
the court maintained that because of the lease agreement, the
owners "could not establish absence of a direct or indirect con-
tractual relationship necessary to maintain the affirmative
defense." '
Similarly, in O'Neil v. Picillo,"'3 the court found that defendant
generators did not qualify for the third party defense because
they failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that, "a totally unrelated third party [was] the sole cause of the re-
lease." 133 Thus, the Picillo court comingled the sole cause and
contractual relationship tests into a single analysis, without consid-
eration of the contractual relationship to determine whether an
element of control existed.
Finally, in United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corpora-
tion'" the court clarified at least one aspect of CERCLA's ambigu-
ous third party defense. Beginning in 1942, Occidental Chemical
Corporation (OCC) used the Love Canal land for waste dispo-
sal. 135 In 1947, OCC purchased the property and then sold it to
the Board of Education of the City of Niagara Falls, New York in
1953. During the 1970's hazardous substances were found in the
surface water, soil, basement of homes, sewers and other locations
surrounding the Love Canal site.3 " Plaintiffs argued that OCC
was strictly liable as an owner at the time of the disposal.137 OCC
raised the third party defense and argued that the "contractual
relationship" exception is inapplicable because the exception was
intended only when the causal third party was an agent of the
131 Id.
'2 682 F. Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988).
' Id. at 728 (emphasis in original). The court held that it was likely that the disposers
with whom defendants contracted were responsible. Id. Defendants had argued that they
consigned their waste to licensed waste transporters and therefore had no direct or indirect
relationship with the responsible party. Id. at 727-28.
184 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
105 Id. at 549.
18 Id.
1 7 Id. During the period of OCC's ownership it disposed of more than 21,000 tons-42
million pounds of various wastes into the Love Canal. Id. at 549. Note that plaintiff cites
§552 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977) and argues that where ultrahazardous
activity is involved, OCC is strictly liable, absent a showing that the acts of third parties were
willful, malicious and criminal. Id. at 551 n.4. (emphasis added).
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generator or other related party." 8 The court examined the ele-
ments of § 107(b)(3) and stated that OCC could not avoid liability
unless it showed: (1) it was totally blameless in causing the re-
lease13 9 and (2) it had no direct or indirect contractual relation-
ship with one or more third parties who are solely responsible. 40
The court then stated that the SARA amendments clearly indi-
cate that purchasers are estopped from basing the third party de-
fense on acts of sellers and did not extend the defense to the orig-
inal disposer."4
In an effort to clarify whether the element of control should
exist in the contractual relationship, the Hooker court stated:
"OCC's direct or indirect contractual relationships with both the
Board and the City preclude the company's assertion of a viable
third party defense in this case because, as the plaintiffs assert,
OCC was able to control the acts of these subsequent purchasers be-
cause of the nature of its relationship with these defendants in this
case.""" Moreover, the court found that even if no contractual
relationship existed, the defense was unavailable as OCC failed
the sole-cause test.
43
The Hooker court was the first court to scrutinize the nature of
the contractual relationship and expressly apply a control test. It
is submitted that this inquiry into the nature of the contractual
relationship and the extent of defendant's ability to control the
third party, is a necessary exercise in order for the contractual
relationship to fall within the exception.
To provide an effective § 107(b)(3) defense, it is suggested that
courts follow the lead of the Hooker court to determine whether
the innocent landowner defense is available. The defense should
be interpreted to require a separate analysis of the sole cause and
I" Id. at 551. OCC contended that the actions of third parties compromised the barriers
that secured the Canal causing the release. Id. at 552. See Ruhl, supra note 107, at 297
(author suggests the contractual relationship should be read consistent within the scope of
the employee or agent exclusion).
139 Id. at 554.
140 Id. at 558.
141 Id.
142 Id.
"" Id. It is clear that "OCC's disposal practices were at least partially responsible for the
release . . ." Id.
177
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 4: 149, 1988
contractual relationship exception elements,""' as well as a deter-
mination as to whether the potentially responsible person had a
sufficient degree of control over the acts of the third party so as to
prevent contamination.14 This interpretation of the third party
defense is consistent with the intent of Congress to provide a de-
fense for the innocent landowner. 146 Furthermore, since CERCLA
liability is to be construed as the standard of liability under
§ 311 (f) of the Clean Water Act.14 The Clean Water Act, contem-
plates a control element, 148 and it is this interpretation that should
guide the third party defense."
144 See United States v. Serafini, No. 86-1591 at 11, 12 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Feb. 19, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library). The court analyzed the third party defense to require four ele-
ments; the first being sole cause and the second is whether a contractual relationship exists.ld.
145 This approach avoids an innocent owner being held liable for the criminal acts of
third parties. See United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546,
551 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (plaintiffs argued defendants are strictly liable unless the acts of
the third parties are willful, malicious, or criminal); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283,
1283 (D.R.I. 1986) (generator held liable for a transporter's illegal dumping because due
care requires the generator to adequately supervise to ensure waste disposal at the specified
site). The element of control seems to define due care. See also Ruhl, supra note 107, at
297-98 (author questions whether a defendant should be liable for fraudulent concealment
of criminal acts committed by contractual third parties).
14 See Ruhl, supra note 107, at 305-07. The legislative history of the contractual rela-
tionship exception suggests this is the intent of Congress. Id. Such intent to provide a de-
fense for the innocent landowner is illustrated by Congressman Gore's desire to restrict the
contractual relationship exception to situations where a third party is acting on behalf of or
at the defendant's direction. Id. See also Comment, Impact of the 1986 Superfund, supra note
65, at 905. (Congress should either provide an effective innocent landowner defense or do
away with § 107(a)(l)'s imposition of strict liability on owners of land).
14 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(32) (West Supp. 1988).
148 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(f) (West 1986). Section 31 1(f) third party defense provides in
pertinent part:
(1) Except where an owner or operator can provide that a discharge was caused
solely by (A) an act of God, (B) an act of war, (C) negligence on the part of the
United States Government, or (D) an act or omission of a third party without regard
to whether any such act or omission was or was not negligent . .. such owner or
operator . . . shall be liable to the United States Government ....
Id.
"' See United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981) (not third parties because ultimate control retained by
barge owners); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 981-82 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 941 (1978) (independent contractor was not third party within meaning of statute
because he was at all times under ultimate control of ship's master). See also Ruhl, supra
note 107, at 300 and 309-11 (analysis of § 311 of the Clean Water Act which is the basis
for argument that element of control must exist before the third party defense is denied).
Id.
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V. IMPACT OF THE INNOCENT LANDOWNER DEFENSE ON REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
Generally, real estate and other business transactions have been
affected by extensive cleanup costs ' and CERCLA's principles of
strict, joint and several liability."' 1 Although seen as the cure to
CERCLA's sweeping liability,' 52 the innocent landowner defense
instead burdens the owner with substantial investigatory and due
care requirements.153 These requirements of due care and the
duty of inquiry that are needed to qualify for the innocent land-
owner defense are similar to the New Jersey Environmental
Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA),5'' a pre-conveyance statute
which imposes certain affirmative obligations on the parties to cer-
tain transactions.' 5 Furthermore, since the scope of inquiry will
" See supra note 58.
'6' S. Turner, Superfund and the Innocent Landowner, The Impact of Environmental Law
on Real Estate and Commercial Transactions ((N.Y.S.B.A. Course Materials) at 3 (Dec. 15,
1988). CERCLA's principles of strict, joint and several liability and the cost of cleanup
alters a businessman's view of a transaction. Id.
I" S. Turner, Remarks at seminar cosponsored by the Environmental Law Section and
the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the New York State Bar Association(Dec. 15, 1988). Business and real estate industries lobbied to get relief from CERCLA's
liability. Id. As a result the innocent landowner defense was created. Id.
'" See Berz & Spracker, The Impact of Superfund on Real Estate Transactions, Prob. and
Prop., (March/April 1988) at 49. Commentator states: "The major effect of this new
amendment . . . is not to provide limited relief to innocent landowners. Rather, it places
substantial investigatory and remedial obligations on purchasers and sellers of property."
Id. See also Comment, Impact of the 1986 Superfund, supra note 65, at 898 (focus of inquiry
shifts from one of causation to one of notice).
The lowest threshold standard of inquiry seems to be found in a case where a landowner
bought property when the hazardous condition was obvious and visible. United States v.
Serafini, No. 86-1591 at 17 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Feb. 19, 1988), (LEXIS, Genfed library). The
court held the condition of the property alone is not enough to deny the defense without
evidence that defendants' failure to inspect or inquire was inconsistent with good commeri-
cal or customary practices. Id. at 18.
' N.J.S.A. §13:1k-6 et. seq.
150 See Berz & Spracker, supra note 153, at 50; D. Hayes & C. MacKerron, supra note 5,
at 30; Schwenke, supra note 8, at 10362 (while inspection is not an affirmative duty under
CERCLA, it may be necessary to establish a defense). See also Scagnelli & Casazza, New
York's Movement Toward an Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act: Learning From the New
Jersey Experience 8 Envtl. L. Sec. J. (NYSBA) No. 3 at 5 (Sept. 1988). Generally, ECRA
applies to the closing, termination or transferring of operations at covered industrial estab-
lishments. Id. The owner is required to submit to the New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection notice of the transaction and a site evaluation. Id. ECRA must be com-
plied with before consummation of the transaction to ensure the site is "acceptably clean."
Id. Further, failure to clean the property renders the sale voidable at option of the Buyer
or state. Id. at 6.
New York is currently considering two proposals based upon ECRA. See Assembly Bill
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be determined in light of the specialized knowledge of the defend-
ant, commercial transactions will be subject to a higher standard
of inquiry than residential transactions.156
By creating this incentive to investigate and possibly clean up
property prior to litigation, the responsibility for cleanup shifts
from the government to private real estate parties. This burdens
parties to a real estate transaction through increased spending, as
well as causing substantial delays in closing. 5 '
The impact on the lending industry, in particular, is most se-
vere and highly criticized. The possible imposition of liability on
lenders requires them to take costly precautions to protect their
investment and to shield themselves from liability. 58 This chilling
liability can have an "economic ripple" effect at all levels of
society. "59
CONCLUSION
The need for legislation to facilitate prompt cleanup of hazard-
ous waste is irrefutable. CERCLA filled a void in the environmen-
tal legal scheme and provided a framework for cleanup of hazard-
ous waste sites. The ensuing trend toward the expansion of
landowner liability and the unavailability of the innocent land-
owner defense to all who have raised it, perhaps is illustrative of
SARA's theory that the cleanup problem is so important that it
No. 11618 (Attorney General's Legislative Program Bill); Assembly Bill No. 1474-C (Gov-
ernor's Program Bill).
'" See H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 187 (1986). See also Schwenke supra
note 8, at 10363 "[A]II that is clarified by legislative history .. . is that parties to a commer-
cial setting have a greater duty than those in residential settings." Id.
"' See Berz & Spracker, supra note 153, at 53 (authors suggest performance of these
investigative obligations and subsequent cleanup without governmental oversight runs risk
of challenge to the adequacy of the remedial work). See also supra notes 154 and 155
(cleanup under ECRA must be performed prior to legal conveyance).
'" See Comment, Impact of the 1986 Superfund, supra note 65, at 899-900. The author
suggests that § 107(b)(3) may create an incentive for foreclosing lenders to "look but not
find" hazardous waste since finding hazardous substances will prevent an innocent land-
owner status and thus prevent the § 107(b)(3) escape route. Id. at 901.
"6 Id. at 900. The author states that increased costs to the lender will cause the demand
for capital to decline. Id. This in turn will contribute to decreases in housing, construction
and new businesses, and in turn there will be an increase in unemployment. Id. See McMa-
hon, Lender's Perspectives on Hazardous Waste and Similar Liabilities, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10368, 10369 (Sept. 1988) (lender liability schemes tend to devalue the property,
making loans scarcer, and money less available).
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should be borne by society and not just the polluter. However, the
juxtaposition of CERCLA's broad liability scheme and SARA's
new innocent landowner defense suggests that the rights of inno-
cent landowners should not be dismissed.
To reconcile the conflicting policies, it is suggested that the
Hooker court's laudable analysis of the third party defense be fol-
lowed because it clarified some of the requisite elements that a
defendant must prove; namely, the sole cause by a third party and
the lack of a contractual relationship in which defendant had or
should have had control over the acts of the third party. The ele-
ment of control will truncate the contractual exception to the
third party defense, which courts have tended to interpret too
broadly. Still unresolved, however, is the extent of due diligence
an innocent landowner must prove before the defense is allowed.
Is innocence a defense? CERCLA, as amended, indicates it
should be. However, the defense is not certain unless the Hooker
court's interpretation of the third party defense is followed and
guidelines are established to determine whether the landowner
has performed the requisite due diligence. Then, and only then,
will concepts of fairness and innocence no longer be sacrificed to
the countervailing goal of environmental cleanup.
Ginamarie Alvino

